We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
Introduction
When multiple countries share a river, they compete over available water resources. The upstream country has the first option to use water, which may obstruct the overall efficiency of water use [5] . Cooperation between upstream and downstream countries-in the form of a water allocation agreement-may increase the efficiency of water use. Whether cooperation is stable, however, depends on the design of the water allocation agreement.
The stability of water allocation agreements is the subject of this paper.
In the twentieth century, 145 international agreements on water use in transboundary rivers were signed; almost 50% of these agreements cover water allocation issues [43] . The majority of these water allocation agreements does not take into account the hydrologic variability of river flow [19] . This is a shortcoming because variability is an important characteristic of river flow. This variability will even increase in many river basins when the effects of climate change on temperature and precipitation proceed as projected by climate simulation models [23] . These effects are expected to increase the variability of the annual and seasonal flow patterns as well as the frequency of extreme events in many river basins [3, 13, 38, 40] . Recognition of flow variability in the design of water allocation agreements can increase the efficiency of these agreements.
Several studies have addressed this issue for two common sharing rules for water allocation: proportional allocation and fixed flow allocation [for an overview of sharing rules, see 15] . Fixed flow allocations are most common [43] but tend to be less efficient when flow variability increases. Bennett et al. [8] compared the efficiency of fixed flow allocations with proportional allocations and found that, in many situations, proportional allocations are more efficient. Kilgour and Dinar [26, 27] developed a sharing rule 3 that ensures a Pareto-efficient allocation for every possible flow volume, where the level of compensation paid by receivers of water is subject to annual bargaining. Obviously, compared with a proportional or fixed flow allocation, this flexible allocation is more efficient, but it requires accurate predictions of annual river flow. In a case study of the Colorado river, Mendelsohn and Bennett [34] found that the loss of efficiency related to a change in mean river flow (e.g. because of climate change) is higher for a proportional allocation than for a fixed allocation, the main reason being that the initial proportions used were inefficient. Another result was that the largest impact of climate change on efficiency comes from changes in the mean of river flow, not from changes in its variance. Furthermore, in an analysis of U.S. interstate water allocation compacts, Bennett and Howe [7] found that agreement compliance is higher for proportional than for fixed flow allocations.
Apart from being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective instruments to increase the efficiency of water use.
Efficiency and stability of agreements are not necessarily linked. Climate change, for instance, may increase the benefits of cooperation to one country while decreasing those of the other, leaving overall efficiency equal, but possibly giving the country with decreased benefits an incentive to leave the agreement. Because agreements are signed between sovereign nations, there is usually no higher level authority that can enforce compliance. The stability of agreements therefore depends on the distribution of the benefits of cooperation to the countries involved, which can be analysed using game theory. Recent studies [1, 41, 29, 20, 44] showed that water allocation agreements can improve the efficiency of water use and that-when benefits of cooperation are distributed properly-they can be attractive to all coun-tries involved. This game theoretic literature, however, does not explicitly consider the effects of climate change on river flow and agreement stability.
The objective of this paper is to assess the stability of water allocation agreements when climate change affects river flow. This is done by constructing a game theoretic model of water allocation that analyses stability of three sharing rules for water allocation. Results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in variance of river flow decrease stability, and that an agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In sections two and three we present our model and assess stability of cooperation. In section four we illustrate the effects of climate change on the stability of cooperation for different sharing rules, using a numerical example. In section five we assess stability effects of alternative punishment strategies and asymmetric countries. In section six we discuss the results using agreements in the Nile river basin, the Orange river basin, and the South Saskatchewan river basin as illustrations, and we conclude in section seven.
A model of cooperation
A river is shared by two countries i ∈ {u, d}, having its source in the upstream country u and subsequently flowing through the downstream country d. Q t denotes the volume of river flow in year t that is available for use; it excludes the river flow necessary to sustain the environmental functioning of the river system and other vital services such as navigation. In year t, country i uses q i,t units of water. Because of the unidirectional flow of water, u has the first option to use water, which may limit water use by d. All water that was not used by u, is available for use by d:
Benefits B i,t (q i,t ) from water use are concave with a maximum atq i,t . Clearly, if u maximizes benefits of water use, it does not have an incentive to pass water to d that has a positive marginal value to him. Yet, if the benefit to d of using more water outweighs the decrease in benefits to u, there is scope for cooperation, with u passing on water to d. There are many sharing rules to allocate water between countries. We analyse three common sharing rules:
Proportional allocation (PA): u receives αQ t and d receives (1 − α)Q t , with 0 < α < 1;
Fixed upstream allocation (FU): u receives min{β, Q t } and d receives max{Q t − β, 0}, with 0 < β < E(Q t );
Fixed downstream allocation (FD): u receives max{Q t −γ, 0} and d receives
For cooperation to be attractive to u, we need to include non-water transfers m t paid by d to u. These non-water transfers may be monetary or in-kind transfers. There are ample examples of such non-water transfers related to river basin agreements [6] . We assume that non-water transfers are equal to the expected value of compensation of u for benefits foregone 6 and a share of the additional benefits from cooperation. The non-water transfers, paid by d to u, are constant:
where superscript c denotes cooperation, n denotes non-cooperation, and water use-and therefore benefits-depends on the sharing rule agreed upon.
This method to calculate non-water transfers is related to the Nash bargaining solution; a common solution concept from non-cooperative game theory. The Nash bargaining solution of a game maximizes (
subject to x u , x d ∈ F, where F is the feasible set of payoff vectors and
Here, the calculated nonwater transfers equal the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. 1 We analyse the stability of cooperation using an infinitely repeated game-a common approach in the analysis of international environmental agreements [cf. 17]-because water allocation agreements typically do not have a specified termination date. The stage game in year t is played as follows. First, a value of Q t is realized from its probability distribution.
Second, the countries observe Q t and simultaneously choose their action:
u chooses q u,t and d chooses m t . If complying with the agreement, u plays q u,t = q c u,t according to the selected sharing rule, and earns B c u,t = B u,t (q c u,t ). If deviating, u plays q u,t = q n u,t = min{q u,t , Q t }, and earns B n u,t = B u,t (q n u,t ). If complying with the agreement, d plays m t = m c . If deviating, d plays m t = m n = 0. Third, countries observe the strategy played by the other country and receive payoffs. 2 1 Two alternative methods to calculate non-water transfers are the Shapley value and Nucleolus, solution concepts from cooperative game theory. 2 Alternatively, one could assume a Stackelberg game where u is the leader and d is the 7 The decision to cooperate or deviate in year t is based on the expected payoff stream:
We assume that both countries use trigger strategies: when a country deviates, it is punished by the other country in the form of p periods noncooperative play of the stage game, after which countries return to cooperative play (i.e. agreement strategies). Hence, the expected payoff streams to u and d for compliance in year t equal:
where δ is the discount factor. The expected payoff streams to u and d for deviating in year t equal:
The differences, D u and D d , equal the net present value (NPV) of deviating to u and d:
follower. This would, however, not change the general results.
From equation (9) it follows that D u is determined by the difference between benefits of non-cooperative and cooperative play in year t, plus a "punishment" term that has a constant (negative) expected value. From equation (10) it follows that D d is independent from the level of Q t , hence constant, for a given probability distribution of Q. Because D d is negative at Q t = E(Q t )-an agreement would not be signed if D d ≥ 0 at the expected value of river flow-it is negative for any Q t . Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we will focus only on u's incentive to deviate.
The type of punishment used here differs from Bennett and Howe [7] , who used monetary penalties in their analysis of cooperation between US states. We assume here that there is no authority that can issue this type of penalties when a dispute occurs between nations, a characteristic of many international agreements. In an overview of existing agreements on transboundary freshwater, Beach et al. [6] show that in half of the agreements, disputes are handled by advisory councils, governments' conflictaddressing bodies, the United Nations or other third parties. The other half of the agreements does not refer to any form of dispute resolution. The absence of a higher level authority that can issue penalties is clear; hence a reasonable punishment is non-cooperative behaviour by the other country.
Analysing stability
The folk theorem tells us that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium as long as punishments are severe enough. When discounted payoffs of cooperation outweigh the sum of discounted payoffs of deviation in one year and Nash-payoffs during the subsequent punishment phase, an agreement is said to be stable.
Because of the uncertainty of payoffs in this model, through the stochastic variable Q, it is not possible to assess whether cooperation is stable or not. It is, however, possible to assess the probability of stability. To do this, we need to determine a threshold value of Q t , for which the agreement is In the remainder of this paper we will use this expression as our stability indicator and refer to it simply as "stability". Both for a mean-preserving spread and for a decrease in mean river flow this area decreases in size, which negatively affects stability. We expect the stability of cooperation to be different for different sharing rules. To verify this expectation, we compareQ for the three sharing rules.
In the comparison, we set αE
the water allocation is similar for each sharing rule. In calculatingQ from equation (9) we can ignore the punishment term, because it is equal for all three sharing rules. We can also ignore B n u,t , because it is equal for all three sharing rules. Hence, we only have to compare cooperative benefits B c u,t . There are two situations when B c u,t is not equal for all three sharing rules: if Q t < E(Q t ) and if Q t > E(Q t ). Because we assume thatQ < E(Q t ), we only look at the situation where Q t < E(Q t ). Taking a closer look at FU, we find that D u is maximized at Q t ≥q u,t . To see this, using equation (9), note that we can ignore the punishment term because it is constant. Hence, we consider the maximization problem:
for FU. There are three possibilities:
3. ifq u,t ≤ Q t then q n u,t =q u,t and q c u,t = β.
Clearly, in the last situation, equation (11) is maximized. We argue that the last situation includes Q t = E(Q t ), because we assume thatq u,t ≤ E(Q t ).
This assumption is based on the idea that in the short term, u's economy and infrastructure are not designed to abstract and use (much) more water than is expected in a given year. 3 Because we may assume that D u < 0 for Because FU is stable for any level of river flow, we will focus on PA and FD only in the next section.
Numerical example
To illustrate the results of the model, we use the following numerical example:
The values for α, β, and γ are chosen such that at Q t = E(Q t ) the water allocation is similar for each sharing rule. Because the countries have symmetric benefit functions, the allocation is optimal when Q t = E(Q t ). 4 Further- 3 Ifq u,t E(Q t ), FU is unstable for Q t large enough. 4 Because the countries have symmetric benefit functions in this example, PA will provide a more efficient allocation than FU or FD when climate change effects occur: the total benefits of water use are maximized. This property of the model is similar to results from efficiency studies that were surveyed in the introductory section of this paper [cf. 8]. 13 more, for each sharing rule, cooperation is attractive to both countries for Q t = E(Q t ), because countries would never agree to cooperate if there was no expected gain from cooperation. Two interesting aspects can be observed in figure 2 . First, looking at the FU curve, we can observe that indeed D u < 0 for any level of Q t and that D u is maximized at Q t ≥q u,t . Second, we observe that the point where the FD curve crosses the horizontal axis (Q FD = 32.9) lies to the right of the point where the PA curve crosses the horizontal axis (Q PA = 25.6), hence, PA is more stable than FD. The decrease of D u for Q t less than ±20 is caused by the decreasing gain of deviation relative to the punishment.
The stability of cooperation depends on the probability distribution of Q. In this example we use the gamma distribution to describe f (Q) and f (Q), which is an appropriate and commonly applied distribution in the literature on probabilistic hydrological forecasting [9, 33] . 5 The calculation of expected benefits is still based on E(Q) = 40-the mean of the original probability density function f (Q)-because the agreement will not be immediately adapted at the first signs of climate change effects on river flow. Governments need reliable information before they are willing to change conditions of this type of agreements; long-term observations are needed before a change in the probability distribution of river flow can be assessed.
Punishment and asymmetry
In this section, we assess the effects on stability of two interesting factors: alternative punishment strategies, and asymmetry in benefit functions and political power. For both factors we assess how they affect stability.
Alternative punishment strategies
We have argued that the only possible punishment for deviation by the other country is a trigger strategy of non-cooperative play for p periods.
Variations on this type of punishment are possible. A first example is titfor-tat, where the period of punishment depends on the behaviour of the other country. If u deviates p consecutive years, the punishment period is also p years. A second example is a grim trigger strategy where the period of punishment is infinite. Both strategies and other variations, however, are similar to the strategy described above, with p = 1 and p = ∞ respectively.
More interesting punishment strategies may arise when the issue of water allocation is linked to an other transboundary issue between the two countries [18] . In the game on water allocation, d is the country that benefits most from cooperation. For issue linking to be most effective, this game should be linked to a game where u can benefit more than d [25] , a good example of which is the facilitation of river transport by d to u. It is clear that the punishment term may increase when the two games are linked, as long as the benefits of river navigation to u are sufficiently large.
From these examples it becomes clear that alternative punishment strategies change the size of the punishment term (denoted by θ). To assess the effect of alternative punishment strategies, we take the derivative of equa-tion (9) with respect to this term:
An increase of θ leads to a similar increase of D u , decreasing the stability for each level of river flow. 6 This result holds for each sharing rule. The implication of this result is that for any agreement, the higher the absolute value of the punishment term, the higher the stability of cooperation.
Asymmetry
We consider both asymmetry in political power and asymmetry in benefit functions.
Asymmetry in political power
As exemplified by the Nile basin and described by LeMarquand [30] , the distribution of political power has implications for the incentives for cooperation. In this model, we can incorporate this aspect through the level of , which we define here to be a measure of political power for the upstream country. When benefit functions are symmetric, Kilgour and Dinar [27] have shown that in an efficient situation, the surplus benefit is equally shared between the two countries; in our model this implies that = 0.5.
When < 0.5, d has more political power than u and therefore a stronger bargaining position. As a result, the non-water transfer from d to u is lower than in a situation with equally distributed political power. To assess the effect of political power on stability, we take the derivative of equation (9) with respect to :
Equation (13) result is that when is high, the non-water transfer is high, and therefore cooperation is attractive to u. Changes in the distribution of political power after an agreement has been signed have no effect on stability because the effect of on D u works via m c , which has been fixed.
Asymmetry in benefit functions Asymmetry in benefit functions between countries is assessed using the same functional form of the benefit function as the one introduced in section 4. The effect of asymmetric benefit functions is simulated by scaling u's benefit function by a factor η. Hence, B u,t = η aq u,t − bq 2 u,t and B d,t = aq d,t − bq 2 d,t . To assess the effect on stability, we analyse how η affects D u by taking the derivative of equation (9) with 18 respect to η:
Equation (14) Changes in η after an agreement has been signed can also be calculated.
Such a change may occur because of demographic or economic developments. This effect does not influence m c , because m c has been fixed in the agreement. Therefore, to assess the effect on stability, we analyse how η affects D u by taking the derivative of equation (9) with respect to η, similar to equation (14), but assuming that m c is fixed:
Combining equations (14) and (15) gives:
Equation (16) also yields a positive value. An increase of η after an agreement has been signed leads to an increase of D u , decreasing the stability for each level of river flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. The implication of this result is that for any agreement, if benefits to u increase after the agreement has been signed, the stability of cooperation decreases.
Discussion
The analysis presented here shows that climate change affects the stability of water allocation agreements. The precise effect on stability depends on (i) the characteristics of the river basin: its hydrological regime and the effects of climate change on river flow, and (ii) the characteristics of the agreement: in particular the sharing rule, the countries' benefit functions, and Agriculture is the main water using sector in both Egypt and in Sudan. Because developments in irrigation techniques are nearly complete in Egypt, while Sudan still lacks the resources to expand its irrigated area [42] , average yields are much higher in Egypt [16] . Hence, benefits of water use are higher in Egypt than in Sudan.
Studies of climate change effects on the hydrology of the Nile river basin find different results. Some models predict decreases while others predict increases in river flow [22] . Arnell [2] and Voss et al. [40] predict water claims made by Ethiopia [42] are two factors that are likely to decrease stability. Population growth will increase benefits of water use to Sudan, increasing its incentive to deviate. When, somewhere in the future, Ethiopia is also allocated a share of the Nile water, increased scarcity in Sudan and Egypt will increase Sudan's incentive to deviate even further. In general, predictions of climate change effects in Southern Africa indicate reduced precipitation and an increase of evaporation [22] . There is, however, some uncertainty for the Orange river basin. Although Arnell [2] finds that there is a great reduction in runoff by the year 2050 in Southern Africa, predictions for the Orange river basin do not clearly indicate whether and how mean and variance of river flow will change [21] . Nevertheless, current river flow in the Orange river basin knows already large variability [14] .
Orange river basin
Putting these observations into the perspective of the model developed in this paper, we can conclude that the stability of cooperation in the Orange river basin between Lesotho and RSA could be negatively affected by its FD sharing rule, but it is not, because Lesotho's demand for water lies far below its available resources. Positive effects on stability are provided by Saskatchewan is not paying a non-water transfer to Alberta. There is no need for such a transfer because up to now, water use in the South Saskatchewan river basin has not been limited by water availability. Alberta, therefore, has always met its obligation to pass on 50% of river flow.
In recent years, however, water use is getting close to 50% of river flow in Alberta, partly due to Alberta's fast growing economy. Water use in Saskatchewan is much lower and increasing at a lower rate.
Two distinct trends affect water availability in the basin. On the one hand, climate change effects are projected to decrease mean river flow by 4-10% and to decrease low flow levels by 14-22% by 2046. On the other hand, the combined effects of population growth, economic growth, and increasing irrigation efficiency are projected to increase water use. With lower water availability and increasing water use, Alberta is expected to face water shortage in the coming decades [11] . In theory, the use of punishment strategies enhances cooperation in a repeated game. In our model, however, punishment of u by d also decreases benefits to d, because the non-cooperative outcome gives d lower benefits than the cooperative outcome. Shortening the period of punishment is therefore always beneficial to d, which undermines its credibility of actually going to punish in case of deviation by u. It is this lack of credibility of punishment strategies that might obstruct the effective use of punishment strategies in international agreements on water allocation [12] . Ideally, punishment is implemented in a linked game, which does not affect the benefits of the punishing country. Again, the facilitation of river transport by d to u is a good example.
Mendelsohn and Bennett [34] find that the impact of climate change on the mean of river flow is a far more important determinant for efficiency than its impact on the variance of river flow. For both the Nile and Orange river basin discussed above, where model predictions on the mean river flow are not distinct, this implies that the expected efficiency of the agreement is not expected to change because of climate change. Our model suggests that, although this conclusion may hold for efficiency, it does not hold for the stability of cooperation. Stability is affected by changes in both mean and variance of river flow. Hence, both the mean and variance of river flow have to be taken into account when negotiating agreements on water allocation.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to assess the stability of water allocation agreements when climate change affects river flow. A game theoretic model is constructed that analyses the stability of cooperation in water allocation 27 between two countries for three sharing rules. The stability of cooperation is expressed in terms of the probability that one of the two countries deviates from the specified agreement actions, given that the countries maximize their expected payoff stream (consisting of benefits of water use and nonwater transfers).
Deviation from agreement actions is found unattractive to the down- This paper shows that the stability of water allocation agreements can be affected by climate change. This paper adds to the analysis of water allocation agreements by focusing on stability aspects, where others have focused on efficiency aspects. Where Bennett et al. [8] found that proportional allocations are more efficient in many situations, we find that proportional 28 allocations are less stable than fixed upstream allocations. Where Mendelsohn and Bennett [34] found that the largest impact of climate change on efficiency comes from changes in the mean of river flow, we find that both changes in mean and variance affect stability. Because water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to increase the efficiency of water use, the results of this paper are important for the design of water allocation agreements and especially the selection of a sharing rule.
